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RECAPTURING THE SPIRIT OF FURMAN:
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
AND THE NEW ABOLITIONIST POLITICS
AUSTIN SARAT*
I
INTRODUCTION
When, in 1972, the Supreme Court halted executions—finding the applica-
tion of the death penalty incompatible with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment1—many in the anti-capital punishment
movement saw it as the penultimate step in a long struggle to end state killing.2
They were confident that the Furman opinions of Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall pointed the way toward an impending judicially imposed abolition of capi-
tal punishment, and they carefully plotted the steps necessary to bring that re-
sult to fruition.  As Philip Kurland wrote at the time:
One role of the Constitution is to help the nation to become “more civilized.”  A soci-
ety with the aspirations that ours so often asserts cannot consistently with its goals,
coldly and deliberately take the life of any human being no matter how reprehensible
his past behavior. . . .  In the Furman v. Georgia decision the inevitable came to pass.3
Jack Greenberg of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund expressed a similar under-
standing of the significance of Furman when he said, “There will no longer be
any more capital punishment in the United States.”4
From the perspective of a quarter century later, these predictions look quite
naïve as well as somewhat forlorn.  As is now well known, after Furman some-
thing unexpected happened.  Whereas in other Western nations the abolition of
the death penalty was followed by a downturn in public interest and support for
capital punishment,5 in Furman’s wake, a dramatic pro-capital punishment
backlash occurred.  “State legislatures . . . quickly responded to the Court’s de-
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1. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, Challenging the Death Penalty, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 624
(1974) (reviewing MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973)).
3. Philip Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 296-
97 (1972).
4. MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 291 (1973).
5. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 12-15 (1986).
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cision, but instead of conducting a thorough reevaluation of the subject, they
enacted whatever statutory revisions they perceived as correcting the constitu-
tional flaws contained in pre-Furman capital laws.”6  Public reaction followed a
similar pattern, “with a hostile response all over the country.”7  Thus, four years
after Furman’s limited abolition of capital punishment, the Court, in Gregg v.
Georgia,8 found that “it is now evident that a large proportion of American so-
ciety continues to regard [capital punishment] as an appropriate and necessary
criminal sanction.”9  As a result, the Court held that “the punishment of death
does not invariably violate the Constitution.”10
Since the mid-1970s, the political and legal climate for abolition of the
death penalty has grown progressively more hostile.  Proponents of capital
punishment have responded to Furman with a mean-spirited revisionism.11
Procedural guarantees once thought minimally necessary to secure fairness and
reliability in capital sentencing have been openly and enthusiastically jetti-
soned.  American society seems even more impatient with the procedural nice-
ties and delays attendant to what many now see as excessive scrupulousness in
the handling of capital cases.  What good is having the death penalty, so the re-
frain goes, if there are so few executions?12  Blood must be let; lives must be
turned into corpses; the charade of repeated appeals prolonging the lives of
those on death row must be brought to an end.  In response, numerous recent
decisions of the Supreme Court have eroded, not enhanced, the procedural in-
tegrity of the death sentencing process.13
The Court has moved rather methodically, if not in a linear fashion, to cut
off all systemic, “wholesale” challenges to the constitutionality of capital pun-
ishment.14  And public support for the death penalty has risen virtually to un-
precedented levels.  Today most national polls show support in the seventy to
                                                          
6. Id. at 41.
7. Id. at 42.
8. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
9. Id. at 179.
10. Id. at 169.
11. For an example of the premises that produce such revisionism, see Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Com-
mentary: Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1039 (1989).  For an illuminating discussion of
this mean-spirited revisionism, see Anthony Amsterdam, Selling a Quick Fix for Boot Hill: The Myth
of Justice Delayed in Death Cases, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS,
AND CULTURE (Austin Sarat ed., 1999).
12. For an interesting argument about the execution rate, see Samuel R. Gross, The Romance of
Revenge: Capital Punishment in America, 13 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 71, 92-99 (1993).
13. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
14. See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305; see also Anthony G. Am-
sterdam, In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 14 HUM. RTS. 14 (1987).
Here perhaps the most important rebuff to the “wholesale” approach occurred in McCleskey v. Kemp,
in which the Court refused to invalidate the death penalty even in the face of statistical evidence of
systemic racial disparities in the administration of capital punishment.  See 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987).
As William Bowers argues, “The Court’s ruling in McCleskey meant that the kind of evidence that
would suffice to save McCleskey’s job could not save his life.”  See William Bowers, Capital Punish-
ment and Contemporary Values: People’s Misgivings and the Court’s Misperceptions, 27 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 157, 158 (1993).
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seventy-five percent range.15  The political and public appetite for legally im-
posed death seems almost insatiable;16 where once an execution was the stuff of
front page and television evening news coverage, today, except in unusual cir-
cumstances, execution has been routinized.17  Politicians of every stripe do not
want to be caught on the “wrong side” of the death penalty debate.18  Abolition
now has meager support, and the abolition movement has become virtually in-
visible.19
If that were not enough, courts have grown impatient with the complex le-
gal process the Supreme Court constructed to ensure fairness in the administra-
tion of law’s ultimate penalty.20  In recent years, in an apparent effort to limit
the reach of the Eighth Amendment as a source of protection for capital defen-
dants, the Supreme Court has gradually cut back on the availability of federal
habeas corpus relief in death penalty cases.21  Through decisions dealing with
procedural default,22 exhaustion,23 and abuse of the writ through the filing of
successive habeas petitions,24 the Court has made it increasingly difficult for
lower federal courts to reach the merits of a defendant’s habeas claims.
Some years ago, in one of the most significant of these cutbacks, the Court
declared that defendants must generally base their habeas petitions on asserted
violations of the federal law as it existed at the time of the original state pro-
ceedings.25  In a follow-up case, it held that if the federal law was unclear at that
                                                          
15. For a discussion of the nature of public opinion about the death penalty, see Bowers, supra
note 14, at 162; Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth
Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 171; see also Robert M. Bohm,
American Death Penalty Opinion, 1936-1986: A Critical Examination of the Gallup Polls, in THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT RESEARCH 113 (Robert M. Bohm ed., 1991).
16. See Bowers, supra note 14, at 157, 162.  Wendy Lesser argues that there is a “crucial connec-
tion between murder and theaterbetween death imposed on a human being by another human being,
and dramatic spectacle.”  WENDY LESSER, PICTURES AT AN EXECUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
SUBJECT OF MURDER 7 (1993).
17. See Susan Blaustein, Witness to Another Execution: In Texas, Death Walks an Assembly Line,
HARPER’S, May 1994, at 53; see also Austin Sarat, Killing Me Softly: Capital Punishment and the Tech-
nologies of Death, in COURTING DEATH: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORTALITY (Desmond
Manderson ed., forthcoming 1999).
18. For a discussion of Bill Clinton’s concerted efforts to stay on the “right side” of the death pen-
alty issue, see Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105.
19. See Michael Oreskes, The Political Stampede on Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1990, at A16.
20. That process is described by Jack Greenberg, The Capital Punishment System, 91 YALE L.J.
908 (1982); Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment in
the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (1992).
21. The Court has long viewed itself as having the authority to alter the scope of federal habeas,
even without new legislation.  See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977) (referring to the Court’s
“historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where the
statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged”).
22. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 72.
23. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
24. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
25. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).  The portion of Justice O’Connor’s lead opinion
in Teague referred to in the text garnered only three other votes, and thus is technically only a plurality
opinion.  However, in the subsequent case of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), Justice O’Connor
picked up the additional vote of Justice White, who had refused to join the relevant portion of her
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time, any reasonable, “good faith” interpretation of the federal law by the state
courts immunizes the conviction and sentence from later habeas attack.26  Even
more recently, the Court extended the same principle to the method of applica-
tion of the federal law to the facts of a particular case; if the state court’s
method of application was proper in view of the precedents that existed at that
time, then federal habeas relief is unavailable, even if those precedents are later
overruled or changed.27
These decisions have already made it much more difficult for a defendant
who receives a death sentence to obtain federal habeas review of the merits of
whatever decisions or rulings might have been made by the judge during his
capital trial.28  So hostile have the courts become to extended litigation in capi-
tal cases that in one case where there had been repeated last minute requests
for a stay of execution in several different courts, the Supreme Court usurped
the legal prerogatives of the lower courts and took the unprecedented step of
ordering that no further stays be granted.29  Even new evidence of actual inno-
cence has been found to be inadequate as the basis for challenging a death sen-
tence.30  For the current Supreme Court, “finality is more important than hear-
ing every meritorious legal claim; there simply comes a point when legal
proceedings must end and punishment must be imposed.”31  Moreover, two
years ago, Congress delivered a one-two punch directed against those who con-
tinue to oppose the death penalty, first enacting Title I of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, which severely limited the reach of federal
habeas corpus protections for those on death row,32 and then de-funding Post-
Conviction Defender Organizations, which provided legal representation for
many of those contesting their death sentences.33
Little did abolitionists realize that Furman would be the legal and political
highwater mark of their efforts and that, a quarter century later, they would
                                                          
opinion in Teague.  Thus, the relevant portion of Justice O’Connor’s opinion now represents the views
of a majority of the Court.
26. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990).
27. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992).
28. See Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced Federal Ha-
beas Corpus Petitioners Be Able to Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE  357 (1990-91); James Liebman, More Than “Slightly Retro”: The Rehnquist Court’s Rout of
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537 (1990-91).  See
generally Steven M. Goldstein, Expediting the Federal Habeas Corpus Review Process in Capital Cases:
An Examination of Recent Proposals, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 599 (1990) (discussing various legislative
proposals to restrict federal habeas).
29. See Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000 (1992); see also Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court,
The Death Penalty, and The Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205 (1992).
30. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993).  In response to Herrera, Justice Blackmun
charged the Court with coming “perilously close to murder.”  Id. at 446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemrinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton Harris, 102
YALE L.J. 225, 226 (1992).  “[T]he Court’s desire to expedite the process of death . . . has now accrued
a life of its own.”  Id. at 253; see also Joseph L. Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. L.J.
817 (1993).
32. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
33. See Harvey Berkman, Costs Mount for Indigent Defense, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at A18.
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still be fighting to recapture the terrain that Furman defined, a terrain I have
elsewhere called “abolitionism as legal conservatism.”34  On this terrain, the
campaign to abolish capital punishment no longer takes the form of a frontal
assault on the morality or constitutionality of state killing.  Instead, arguments
against the death penalty occur in the name of constitutional rights other than
the Eighth Amendment, in particular due process and equal protection.  Aboli-
tionists today argue against the death penalty claiming that it has not been, and
cannot be, administered in a manner that is compatible with our legal system’s
fundamental commitments to fair and equal treatment.
This article locates the American Bar Association’s (“ABA’s”) recent call
for a moratorium on executions35 in the context of contemporary abolitionist
politics.  It shows how the new abolitionism fuels the work of many in the anti-
death penalty community today even as they confront an increasingly hostile
political and legal environment.  The article argues that the new abolitionism
links anti-death penalty work with a broader civil rights agenda and helps sus-
tain what I label “democratic optimism” in the face of the bleakness of the pre-
sent moment.  These arguments are developed by reporting on the attitudes of
a small group of lawyers who specialize in representing people on death row
and who are today the core of the abolitionist movement.36  The article con-
cludes by noting that while the ABA is a relative latecomer to the new aboli-
tionist politics, its entry into the fray is, nonetheless, quite significant.  The
ABA resolution legitimates arguments often dismissed as mere partisan at-
tempts to erect “technical” roadblocks on the path from death sentences to
executions and lends important symbolic capital to death penalty opponents.
II
THE “NEW ABOLITIONISM”37
In February 1994, Justice Harry Blackmun of the United States Supreme
Court wrote, “From this day forward I no longer shall tinker with the machin-
ery of death.”38  This dramatic proclamation capped his evolution from long-
time supporter of the death penalty, to tinkerer with various procedural
schemes and devices designed to rationalize death sentences, and then to out-
right abolitionist.  Twenty-two years before his abolitionist announcement,
Blackmun dissented in Furman v. Georgia, refusing to join the majority of his
                                                          
34. Austin Sarat, Abolitionism as Legal Conservatism: The American Bar Association, the Death
Penalty, and the Continuing Anxiety About Law’s Violence, 1.2 THEORY & EVENT 5 (1997)
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_&_event/v001/1.2sarat.html>.
35. See American Bar Ass’n, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Feb. 1997), reprinted in Ap-
pendix, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (Autumn 1998) [hereinafter ABA Resolution].
36. I conducted in-person interviews with 40 death penalty lawyers in 10 states between 1993 and
1995 (notes on file with author).
37. Parts of the following section are taken from Sarat, supra note 34 ( 1997 The Johns Hopkins
University Press; used with permission).
38. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari
to Callins v. Collins, 998 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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colleagues in what he labeled the “legislative” act of finding execution, as then
administered, cruel and unusual punishment.39  Four years after Furman, he
joined the majority in Gregg v. Georgia, deciding to reinstate the death penalty
in the United States.40  However, by the time of his abolitionist conversion,
Blackmun had left a trail of judicial opinions moving gradually, but inexorably,
away from this early embrace of death as a constitutionally legitimate punish-
ment.41  As a result, his 1994 denunciation of capital punishment was as cate-
gorical as it was vivid—“I will no longer tinker with the machinery of death.”  It
was most significant as a factor in the transformation of abolitionist politics, as
an example of abolition as legal conservatism, and as an indicator of the anxiety
that abolitionists seek to cultivate in the face of the increased popularity of the
most dramatic instance of law’s violence.
In the United States, opposition to the death penalty traditionally has been
expressed in several guises.  Some have opposed the death penalty in the name
of the sanctity of life.42  Even the most heinous criminals, so this argument goes,
are entitled to be treated with dignity.43  In this view, there is nothing that any-
one can do to forfeit their “right to have rights.”44  Others have emphasized the
moral horror, the “evil” of the state willfully taking the lives of any of its citi-
zens.45  Still others believe that death as a punishment is always cruel and, as
such, is incompatible with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment.46
Each of these arguments has been associated with, and is an expression of,
humanist liberalism or political radicalism.  Each represents a frontal assault on
the simple and appealing retributivist rationale for capital punishment.47  Each
puts the opponents of the death penalty on the side of society’s most despised
and notorious criminals; to be against the death penalty one has had to defend
the life of Sirhan Sirhan, John Gacey, Timothy McVeigh, cop killers, and child
murderers.  Thus it is not surprising that while traditional abolitionist argu-
ments have been raised repeatedly in philosophical commentary, political de-
bate, and legal cases, none has ever carried the day in the debate about capital
punishment in the United States.48  By the time Blackmun wrote his 1994 opin-
ion, it looked like none ever would.
                                                          
39. 408 U.S. 238, 410 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
41. See Jeffrey B. King, Now Turn to the Left: The Changing Ideology of Justice Harry A. Black-
mun, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 277, 297 (1996); see also Randall Coyne, Marking the Progress of a Humane
Justice: Harry Blackmun’s Death Penalty Epiphany, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 367 (1995).
42. See ALBERT CAMUS & ARTHUR KOESTLER, REFLECTIONS ON THE GUILLOTINE 169 (1958).
43. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND
POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 16 (1987).
44. Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring).
45. See GEORGE KATEB, THE INNER OCEAN: INDIVIDUALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 191-
92 (1992).
46. See BEDAU, supra note 43, at 92-128.
47. For one example of the retributivist rationale, see generally WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1979).
48. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 5, at 148.
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Blackmun’s abolitionism found its locus in neither liberal humanism nor
radicalism, nor in the defense of the most indefensible among us.  It was, in-
stead, firmly rooted in the mainstream legal values of due process and equal
protection.  Blackmun did not reject the death penalty because of its violence,
argue against its appropriateness as a response to heinous criminals, or criticize
its futility as a tool in the war against crime.  Instead, he shifted the rhetorical
grounds.
Harkening back to Furman, as if rewriting his opinion in that case, Black-
mun focused on the procedures through which death sentences were decided:49
[D]espite the efforts of the [s]tates and the courts to devise legal formulas and proce-
dural rules . . . the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination,
caprice, and mistake. . . .  Experience has taught us that the constitutional goal of
eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination from the administration of death . . . can
never be achieved without compromising an equally essential component of funda-
mental fairness—individualized sentencing.50
Two things stand out in Blackmun’s argument.  First, he acknowledges law’s
effort to purge death sentences of any taint of procedural irregularity.  As he
sees it, the main implication of Furman is that a death penalty is constitutional
only if it can be administered in a manner compatible with the guarantees of
due process and equal protection.  Here Blackmun moves the debate away
from the question of whether capital punishment is cruel or whether it can be
reconciled with society’s evolving standards of decency.  Second, he identifies a
constitutional conundrum in which consistency and individualization—the twin
commands of the Supreme Court’s post-Furman death penalty jurisprudence—
could not be achieved simultaneously.  As a result, Blackmun concludes that
“the death penalty cannot be administered in accord with our Constitution.”51
Blackmun’s language is unequivocal; after more than twenty years of effort,
Blackmun says, in essence, “enough is enough.”
The new abolitionism that Blackmun championed presents itself as a reluc-
tant abolitionism, one rooted in an acknowledgment of the damage that capital
punishment does to central legal values and to the legitimacy of the law itself.
It finds its home in an embrace, not a critique, of those values.  Those who love
the law, in Blackmun’s view, must hate the death penalty for the damage it
does to the object of that love.  “Rather than continue to coddle the Court’s
delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved,” Blackmun stated,
“I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death
penalty experiment has failed.  It is virtually self-evident to me now that no
combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save the
death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.”52  In this admoni-
tion, we again see Blackmun’s categorical conclusion that nothing can “save”
                                                          
49. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995).
50. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1157.
52. Id. at 1145.
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capital punishment, a conclusion spoken both from within history, as a report
of the result of an “experiment,” but also from an Archimedean point, in which
the failure of the death penalty is “self-evident” and permanent.
Blackmun’s brand of abolitionism describes an important contemporary
avenue for engagement in the political struggle against capital punishment,
providing abolitionists a position of political respectability while simultane-
ously allowing them to change the subject from the legitimacy of execution to
the imperatives of due process.  Blackmun’s rhetoric enables opponents of
capital punishment to respond to the overwhelming political consensus in favor
of death as a punishment;53 they no longer have to take on that consensus fron-
tally.  They can say that the most important issue in the debate about capital
punishment is one of fairness and not one of sympathy for murderers; they can
position themselves as defenders of law itself, as legal conservatives.  One
could, new abolitionists now were able to concede, believe in the retributive- or
deterrence-based rationalizations for the death penalty and yet still be against
the death penalty; one could be as tough on crime as the next person yet still
reject capital punishment.  All that is required to generate opposition to execu-
tion is a commitment to the view that law’s violence should be different from
violence outside the law, as well as a belief that that difference could or should
be rooted in the fairness and rationality of the violence that law does.
III
VOICES FROM THE BATTLEFIELD54
Blackmun was not alone in articulating a new basis for abolitionist politics.
His 1994 opinion was significant less as a new development and more as an ex-
pression of sentiment already well articulated by a small group of lawyers who
specialize in representing persons condemned to death in appellate and post-
conviction procedures.55  Through their lawyering, they seek to prevent execu-
tions and, at the same time, end capital punishment.  In their practice, they
                                                          
53. For a description of this consensus, see Phoebe Ellsworth & Samuel Gross, Hardening of Atti-
tudes; Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 48 (1994).
54. Some of the material in this section is taken from Austin Sarat, Between (The Presence of)
Violence and (The Possibility of) Justice: Lawyering Against Capital Punishment, in CAUSE LAW-
YERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 317 (Austin Sarat & Stu-
art Scheingold eds., 1998) (used with permission).
55. It is impossible to give a precise estimate of the number of people who comprise the “death
penalty bar” in the United States.  However, practitioners estimate that number to be about 200 law-
yers.  Approximately that number regularly attend the annual Airlie Capital Punishment Conference
sponsored by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.  Those who do appellate and post-conviction work
practice in a variety of settings; some work for public interest organizations like the Southern Center
for Human Rights, the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, the American Civil Liberties Union,
or the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.  Some are in private practice, and some are in agencies (for ex-
ample, Federal Defenders Offices) funded by state or federal government for the purpose of providing
representation to persons sentenced to death.
SARAT.FMT.DOC 05/18/99  3:44 PM
Page 5:  Autumn 1998] SPIRIT OF FURMAN 13
have daily contact with state violence; they use legal processes in an effort to
stop that violence.56
Death penalty lawyers, those who are indeed engaged in an ideologically
motivated campaign against capital punishment, find themselves fighting for
what increasingly looks like a losing cause.57  While they have the advantage of
being able to invoke the formal rights and protections of liberal-legalism, the
legal system, as I have already noted, seems ever more inhospitable to them
and their work.58  To oppose the death penalty through the legal process in the
United States in the 1990s is not unlike fighting against apartheid in the courts
of South Africa in the 1970s, or litigating on behalf of Palestinian rights in the
occupied territories in the 1980s.59  In the face of a legal system ever more com-
plicit in the state’s effort to impose violence, one might then ask how they have
adapted their lawyering activities to the prevailing hostile legal climate.  One
way in which they have done so is to turn from the old, humanist abolitionism
to the new abolitionism.
The new abolitionism found among anti-death penalty lawyers is rooted in
procedural rather than substantive claims and in the discourse of law rather
than of morality.  It expresses itself as a form of legal conservatism.  The death
penalty is rejected, not because of its violent and dehumanizing qualities or for
what it says about the relationship of citizens to their government, but because
of its corrupting and corrosive effects on the legal system and because it un-
dermines the fundamental legal values of due process and equal treatment.  In
explaining the strategic orientation of her legal work, one of the new abolition-
ists said,
I’m frustrated because I’m not a great liberal.  In fact, in many ways I’m pretty con-
servative.  But I believe that if we are going to truly have a system of law, law has to
operate in a way that ensures fundamental fairness, and that is what we don’t have in
the death penalty.  If they try to seek it against the wealthy, they don’t get it because
                                                          
56. Despite the importance of what they do, their work has been almost invisible to the scholarly
community.  In outlining an agenda for future research in the area of capital punishment, Franklin
Zimring described the significance of what he called “the capital punishment bar.”  See Franklin E.
Zimring, On the Liberating Virtues of Irrelevance, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 9, 15 (1993).  Zimring suggested
that “the litigation of death penalty issues has produced in some states a group of appeals lawyers who
are a full-time capital punishment bar.”  Id.  He called on scholars to investigate how “attorneys in this
sort of practice define their roles and . . . their attitudes toward the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system.  This study is the most immediately interesting, but not the only, research undertaking that
would investigate the role of capital punishment as an influence on the legal profession.”  Id.  For
studies of the death penalty bar, see MELTSNER, supra note 4; James M. Doyle, The Lawyers’ Art:
“Representation” in Capital Cases, 8 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 417 (1996); Austin Sarat, Bearing Witness
and Writing History in the Struggle Against Capital Punishment, 8 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 451 (1996);
Sarat, supra note 54; Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996); Eric L. Muller, Note, The Legal Defense Fund’s Capital Punishment Cam-
paign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 158 (1985).
57. See Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1643 (1993).
58. See Weisberg, supra note 14.
59. See Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE
LAWYERING, supra note 54, at 69; see also Ronen Shamir, Litigation as a Consummatory Action: The
Instrumental Paradigm Reconsidered, 11 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 41 (1991).  As Shamir argues, even in
conditions of oppression, petitioners turn to courts because they “are able, for the first time, to express
their grievances and to materialize their appeal for grace and abstract justice.”  Id. at 61.
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they get good lawyers who do the work and juries don’t return it.  But they can do
what they want to minorities.  In that situation, I have to use my skills to level the
playing field.  For me that is why I do it, to level the playing field.  I can’t do it in very
many cases, but here I can do a bit to make it more level.60
Or, as another explained,
When I first thought about doing death penalty work I had very complicated views
about the death penalty.  I was agnostic on the underlying philosophical issues.  I
didn’t, and don’t, think of myself as an abolitionist.  When I hear the Amnesty Inter-
national people talk, I want to be distant from them because they speak in hyperbole.
But when I started, I talked to people who said that you didn’t have to be an aboli-
tionist in the classic sense because the application of the system is so unfair that your
interest should just be on fairness.  I have come to think that it is inappropriate for the
state to be executing individuals with very few exceptions.  I think that it’s probably
appropriate to execute people who commit crimes like high treason.  However, my
current view is that we should stop it.  You can never get to the theoretical debate be-
cause the system we actually have is so far from perfect.  If we had a perfect system,
then we could think about the theoretical issue.  But in fact we don’t have anywhere
near close to such a system.  We are executing people just because they have crappy
lawyers who do crappy jobs at trial.  And the actual application of the death penalty is
a travesty.  So my views are primarily in opposition to the system that we have as well
as any system I can imagine in the near future.
The new abolitionism focuses attention on the daily realities of administer-
ing state violence and refuses to engage more abstract, theoretical concerns.
For some in the death penalty bar, this position is connected to a more far-
reaching narrative of violence and justice in which race plays an especially piv-
otal role.  For them, death penalty work is part of a broad-based political strug-
gle for civil rights and political equality.  The cause for which these lawyers are
fighting is only incidentally to stop executions; they are dedicated to using law
in a battle for equality and decent treatment for all persons.  The narrative of
injustice which they construct in their work is “structural” and “systemic”
rather than “legalistic,”61 and the effort to stop executions is valuable insofar as
it provides a strategic vehicle for addressing larger and more encompassing so-
cial issues.  As one young lawyer said,
I think the litigation of death penalty issues in the criminal justice system in the 1990s
is what civil rights litigation was in the ’50s and ’60s.  You are dealing with a group of
people who are in this situation not so much because of what they did, but because of
who they are.  And who they are has a lot to do with the color of their skin and their
socio-economic status.
Another lawyer described his death penalty work as “the civil rights work of
our era.”  He noted that
there are established remedies for discrimination in other areas, whether education or
employment, there is a way to remedy it that uses the courts.  Whereas in our area,
anyone who does this work knows that racism is one of the most important influences
                                                          
60. My interviews lasted from one to three hours.  Transcripts are on file with the author.  In order
to protect the confidentiality of my respondents, I provide minimal descriptive information about
them.
61. For a discussion of these distinctions, see Robert Gordon, Undoing Historical Injustice, in
JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 36-39 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
1996).
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in deciding who gets the death penalty and who doesn’t, who’s prosecuted for capital
murder and who’s not.  And yet a real remedy doesn’t exist.
Yet the prevalence of such a broad-based political critique among some
death penalty lawyers should not be taken to suggest that radical political
commitment overcomes legal conservatism in this community.  As a woman in
private practice explained, “I’m a mixed bag.  I’m not like a knee-jerk liberal.
I’m fiscally pretty conservative.  I live out in the suburbs, a very conventional
lifestyle.  I have a little girl.  I’m married.  I guess I would say I’m a moderate.”
Still others, while distancing themselves from the abolitionist label, note the
importance of a deep commitment to the struggle against capital punishment.
As one lawyer explained,
I guess people could say, “Well, I’m not an abolitionist and I think that there is some-
one out there who should get it” and still be driven by a certainty about their client’s
case.  But I doubt it.  Those people are not driven at the same level if they don’t be-
lieve that this is more than just a job, and it is about more than just one client.
They’re going to avoid connecting with them as human beings because of a desire not
to have it intrude on their lives.  If there is a mob out there that wants to kill your guy,
you are going to have to stop it singlehandedly and that means making some pretty
serious exertions.  At that point, you better not be thinking, “This is just a job.”  It
better be a real important cause for you or you just won’t do it.
Death penalty work is, on this account, “more than just a job,” and it re-
quires a commitment to “more than just one client.”  For this lawyer, political
commitment can and should be expressed through client representation.  It
need not be a barrier to effective client advocacy.  In fact, such commitment
seems to be essential if a death penalty lawyer is going to “connect” with the
person he represents.  Connecting with the client at a human level, when every-
where he is regarded as sub-human because of what he has done, is a crucial
component of the political work of death penalty lawyers.
It should not be surprising that even in the face of the importance of the
new abolitionism for anti-death penalty lawyers, some continue to speak of tra-
ditional abolitionism in which the death penalty is rejected as an immoral act.
For them, the immorality of the death penalty is founded on a belief in the in-
compatibility of capital punishment on the one hand and the values of a civi-
lized society on the other.62  As a result, they seek to use their lawyering skills
to stop at least this one aspect of state violence, though even for most of them
traditional abolitionist rhetoric co-exists with new abolitionist strategy.  One
such abolitionist lawyer told me that
I do this work because I’m opposed to the death penalty.  I’m an abolitionist.  I have
responsibilities to individual clients, and those obviously override everything.  But to
me this is an ideological struggle.  I do this work as an extension of my beliefs.  We
are going to take this person in and kill him.  I think deciding to kill someone as a so-
ciety is a decision that reveals society’s corruption.
                                                          
62. See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in
THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 145, 148 (Michael Meyer
& William Parent eds., 1992).
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For many death penalty lawyers, the “ideological struggle” is animated by a
deep opposition to violence.  This opposition is revealed in the comment of a
young woman who worked for several years in a Death Penalty Resource Cen-
ter:
I oppose capital punishment for a multitude of reasons, but mostly from a moral per-
spective.  I don’t think that the government should kill its citizens.  It is a far more
natural impulse to keep people alive than to kill them.  And in my view government is
a parent figure.  The same reason I don’t hit my daughter is why the government
should not kill my clients.  If the government responds in a violent way to the problem
of violence, it is, whatever its intention, sending the message that violence is okay.
Government as “parent” domesticates and familiarizes the debate about the
death penalty.63  It suggests that the question of the death penalty has to be
seen not just in terms of the usual discussion of crime and retribution, but in
terms of its “radiating effects” in the larger society.
“The death penalty is wrong,” another lawyer said, echoing this concern for
its radiating effects, “because it denigrates humanness.  The government
shouldn’t be in the killing business.  It minimizes human life in the sense that
you are saying the government is superior and more important than individual
human lives.”64
Yet it is precisely these arguments that have little or no political resonance
today.  The only avenue that seems even remotely open is to follow Blackmun
and seek to revive the spirit of Furman by claiming that the death penalty has
not been, and cannot be, administered fairly and even-handedly.  For anti-
death penalty lawyers, telling stories of racism, poverty, and family dysfunction
and showing how these things play out in the capital sentencing process endows
their work with political meaning even as it raises the question of whether do-
ing death penalty work is the most strategically sound manner of addressing so-
cial justice issues.65  This is an especially pressing question given what most
death penalty lawyers acknowledge is the very hostile political and legal cli-
mate for their work.
This recognition is captured by a lawyer who said, in a classic understate-
ment, “We are not living in a very good climate for death cases.  There might
not ever be one, but today is certainly not a good one.”  Another lawyer made
the same point by highlighting a change from the days when she first started to
represent people on death row to the present moment:
                                                          
63. The idea of government as “parent” is reminiscent of Justice Brandeis’s belief that “[o]ur
[g]overnment is the potent, omnipresent teacher.”  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
64. As Kateb argues,
the institution of capital punishment strengthens the sentiment that the state owns the lives of
the people.  Many things can be said against capital punishment, but one of the most rele-
vant . . . is that the state’s power deliberately to destroy innocuous (though guilty) life is a
manifestation of the hidden wish that the state be allowed to do anything it pleases with life.
KATEB, supra note 45, at 191-92.
65. For a general treatment of this issue, see Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking
Law’s “Allurements”: A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in
CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 54, at 261.
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When I started there was still so much hope.  Today the train is on the way down the
track and everyone is jumping off, and we are here as the last hope.  But now the
cases are so miserable because of what the courts have done.  The Supreme Court has
continued to put up barriers in our way.  And every time they point you down one
road you go down that road and then they say, “We were just kidding.  We don’t al-
low you down here any more.”  So things have changed.  It’s an injustice what has
happened, an absolute injustice.
This description of a movement from hope to an “absolute injustice” perpe-
trated by courts that are fully attentive and attuned to a belligerent, pro-death
penalty political constituency depends on what Robert Gordon called an
“agency-based” narrative.66  A similar narrative was invoked by a veteran death
penalty lawyer who claimed, “We were beating them at every turn, so long as
they were taking due process seriously.  Then they could never get past us.  So
they just changed the rules.”  Such a change occurred, he explained, because
the pro-death penalty temperature is rising quite a bit.  State legislators just foam at
the mouth to see people executed.  State courts are becoming much more angry and
impatient with anything we say or do.  Attorneys General are more organized in try-
ing to prod and goad the courts into that kind of impatience.  There is a real fight that
we’ve been losing for the past seven or eight years about whether there is going to be
even any pretense to real due process.  The system is full of displaced aggression di-
rected against us and the people we represent.  And now there is a real capital pun-
ishment bureaucracy, maybe 10,000 people across the country.  It’s under pressure
from people who are setting the budget to just move people along toward execution.
For this lawyer, the difficulty of successfully opposing capital punishment has
been compounded by the creation of a death penalty bureaucracy with its own
vested interests and desire for political survival.67
In an environment in which “the pro-death penalty temperature is rising
quite a bit,” courts, once sympathetic to the claims of opponents of the death
penalty, now no longer even “listen.”  “You are continually working hard,” one
lawyer said, “to dig up new facts and identify good issues that will make them
face the horrors of the death penalty, but the most frustrating thing is when you
present it to a court that just doesn’t care.”  In the words of one of her col-
leagues who practices in a public interest setting,
I really do think that there is a deep sense in the community opposed to capital pun-
ishment that nobody listens.  You can file something that’s really long, but it doesn’t
matter [because] they [judges and legislators] aren’t even going to read it.  And if it is
read, it is read with an eye to figuring out how to deny what you are saying.
The question for the death penalty bar, as one practitioner put it,
is not figuring out a strategy for how you are going to win.  If you do this work, you
quickly shed that illusion.  The death penalty is here to stay, at least in our lifetimes.
The question is almost always now “how do you want to lose,” and “where do you
want to lose,” not “how do you win?”  Victory is minimizing the losses you take in
certain places.  You want to sneak by in the middle of the night, as it were, and be de-
nied quietly without any sort of drawing undue attention to what may be your merito-
rious claims in the long, long run.  It really is a question of knowing that you are going
                                                          
66. Gordon, supra note 61, at 36.  An agency-based narrative frames injustice as “wrongs done by
specific perpetrators to specific victims.”  Id.
67. For an interesting study of one part of this bureaucracy, see ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH
WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS (1990).
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to lose.  It’s knowing what do you want to do in the act of losing.  It’s the last word
syndrome, “Right before you die, do you have any last words?”
Because proponents of capital punishment have such a stronghold on public
opinion and are so firmly entrenched in the political process, death penalty
lawyers generally accept that “the death penalty is here to stay” and that vic-
tory consists in “minimizing losses.”  For many, death penalty work has now
become “like working with the terminally ill.  You know that the cure rates are
pretty low.  So you cure the very few that you can and those many who you
can’t cure you make their lives comfortable and fight to keep them alive as long
as possible.”
The perception that the courts are no longer listening to anti-death penalty
arguments and that the best one can hope for is to keep one’s clients alive “as
long as possible” is further compounded by the sense that other kinds of politi-
cal opposition to capital punishment are also futile.  As one practitioner charac-
terized it,
I’m a member of all the abolitionist groups, and we are clearly their major source of
information.  But the truth is that I think that they are so unrealistic.  They are so far
from where public opinion is these days.  I guess it is not surprising that one of the
things that I don’t like about this job is how ineffectual we are so many times.  I don’t
want to be next to the people who are holding the banners when there are six of them
holding their little candles outside when someone inside is being executed, and the
state is voting eighty-five percent for the death penalty.  We get so hammered in pub-
lic, by the press, and by the establishment that the bunker mentality is now really
pretty pervasive.68
It is in this climate that abolitionism has turned conservative, motivated by the
sense that the best hope of ending capital punishment lies in an effort to recap-
ture the spirit of Furman, an effort for which those in the anti-death penalty
movement must adopt a long time horizon.
Those fighting the death penalty today must take seriously Drucilla
Cornell’s admonition that “legal interpretation demands that we remember the
future.”69  In that phrase, Cornell suggests that law fixes its gaze temporally, not
on the possibilities (or impossibilities) of the present, but on a future promise
of justice.  She reminds us that there are, in fact, two audiences for every legal
act, the audience of the present, which, as in the case of the death penalty,
might be unresponsive, and the audience of the future, to which arguments
                                                          
68. This sense of disconnection between the political and legal arms of the movement to end the
death penalty was widespread among the lawyers with whom I spoke.  As one put it, “I don’t have the
faintest idea what one could do from the point of view of a lay person trying to do political action on
the death penalty at this point.  If there is an abolitionist movement left in this country, it is largely
composed of people like me doing legal work.”  Or, as another said, “I think of the lawyers who do
death penalty stuff as the foot soldiers of the movement.  We are the activist arm because a group of
people holding candles outside the Governor’s mansion are not going to end capital punishment.”  Still
another expressed this same sentiment by saying, “It’s hard for me to go to these meetings of do-
gooders who are all beating their chests and upset about the death penalty.  It is just a huge waste of
time.  It’s nothing.  I’d rather blow up the courthouse than sit around and whine about how bad things
have gotten.”
69. Drucilla Cornell, From the Lighthouse: The Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of Legal
Interpretation, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1687, 1709 (1990).
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nonetheless might be addressed.  In this sense, law, as Robert Cover writes, is a
bridge to “alternity.”70
In Cornell’s and Cover’s understanding, the popularity of the new aboli-
tionism among anti-death penalty lawyers might be seen as a form of what
Cover called “redemptive constitutionalism.”71  Through their arguments about
fairness and equality, those lawyers call on Americans to live up to their most
cherished ideals.  They refuse to recognize the violence of the present moment
as the defining totality of law.  For them, as Cover argues, “Redemption takes
place within an eschatalogical schema that postulates: (1) the unredeemed
character of reality as we know it, (2) the fundamentally different reality that
should take its place, and (3) the replacement of one with the other.”72
Cover uses the example of an abolitionist struggle of another era, namely
anti-slavery activism in the mid-nineteenth century, to suggest that the work of
“redemptive constitutionalism” reveals “a creative pulse that proliferates prin-
ciple and precept, commentary and justification, even in the face of a state legal
order less likely to hold slavery unconstitutional than to declare the imminent
kingship of Jesus Christ on Earth.”73  In this view, the abolitionist lawyer sup-
plies the argumentative and interpretive resources to bridge the gap between
the present political climate and a possible future realization of our legal ideals.
But there is perhaps a second way of understanding the utility of the new
abolitionism in the work of anti-death penalty lawyers.  In this second under-
standing, Cover’s image is reversed, and redemption gives way to judgment,
and as this occurs, the future is called on to remember the injustices of the pre-
sent.74  Given this imperative to remember, those lawyers provide
the testimonial bridge which, mediating between narrative and history, guarantees
their correspondence and adherence to each other.  This bridging between narrative
and history is possible since the narrator is both an informed and an honest wit-
ness. . . .  All the witness has to do is to efface himself, and let the literality of events
voice its own self-evidence.  “His business is only to say: this is what happened, when
he knows that it actually did happen.”75
Arguments about present day violations of due process and equal protec-
tion in the administration of capital punishment help to write a history of
shame.  These arguments record the failure of law to restrain the political im-
                                                          
70. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1983).
71. Id. at 34.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 39.
74. For a discussion of the way we think about the future, see JACQUES LE GOFF, HISTORY AND
MEMORY 11 (Steven Rendall & Elizabeth Claman trans., 1992).
75. SHOSHANA FELMAN & DORI LAUB, TESTIMONY: CRISES OF WITNESSING IN LITERATURE,
PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND HISTORY 101 (1992).  Treating anti-death penalty lawyers as witnesses giving
testimony suggests that they are addressing their work to the community of the future as much as the
law of the present.  “To testify before a court of law or before the court of history and of the future,”
as Felman argues, “is more than simply to report a fact or an event or to relate what has been lived,
recorded and remembered.  Memory is conjured here essentially in order to address another, to im-
press upon a listener, to appeal to a community.”  Id. at 204.
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pulses of the moment.  They enable anti-death penalty lawyers to create a rec-
ord, to turn legal institutions into museums of unnecessary, unjust, undeserved
pain and death, of law’s failure to honor its most basic and important commit-
ments in a context where lives are on the line.76
The commitment of abolitionist lawyers to speak to the future and memori-
alize law’s present failures has been ignored by those who have worried too
much about the impact of such lawyering on the political possibilities of the
present.77  But, as Cornell reminds us, legal struggle is as much about the future
as the present, and as much about the possibilities of keeping alive commit-
ments as the current prospects of political success.  Thus, when anti-death pen-
alty lawyers deploy the vocabulary of the new abolitionism, they
posit the very ideal [they] purportedly find “there” in the legal text, and as [they]
posit the ideal or the ethical [they] promise to remain true to it.  [Their] promise of fi-
delity to the ethical or to the ideal is precisely what breathes life into the dead letter
of the law and provides a barrier against the violence of the word. . . .  To heed the
call to responsibility within law is both to remind [ourselves] of the disjuncture be-
tween law and the ideal and to affirm our responsibility to make the promise to the
ideal, to aspire to counter the violence of our world in the name of universal justice.78
This component of the work of death penalty lawyers is referred to, within
that community, as “making a record.”  By “making a record,” death penalty
lawyers do not just describe the legal work of building a case on appeal.  In ad-
dition, they refer to the broader work of witnessing and writing history.  By
making a record, these lawyers surmount, if they cannot stop, the violence of
law’s present and keep alive the possibility of a more just future.  They remem-
ber the future and insist that the future, if it is to be more just, must remember.
“Look, as a lawyer, every single act or omission that I am doing is calcu-
lated to make a record,” one experienced lawyer explained,
but not just the record on appeal.  It is bigger than that.  I think you are making a rec-
ord above and beyond the immediate case.  You are making a record that even after
you ultimately fail to save your client’s life that he was a worthy human being, that
there was an explanation for what he did which the legal system could not, or would
not, hear.  I know that because I know him in ways no one else does.  And that there
are other young men and women out there who can be helped if we learn from this
case.  You see what we do is we tell a story that would otherwise not be told, or re-
membered.  There are lessons in the stories we tell, lessons about poverty, abuse, and
injustice.  Maybe they can’t be heard just yet, but maybe they will be heard sometime.
This lawyer first speaks as a witness, whose work testifies to the humanity of
those condemned to die.  Here, he speaks as someone who has first-hand
knowledge.  “I know that,” he says, “because I know him in ways no one else
does.”  But this lawyer also insists that his work is “bigger than that.”  “Making
                                                          
76. As Minow suggests, legal rights matter not just because they provide dignity to law’s victims,
or because they help to mobilize them to undertake political action, but because they provide an op-
portunity to tell a story that might not otherwise get to be told.  See Martha Minow, Interpreting
Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1876-77 (1987).
77. See McCann & Silverstein, supra note 65, at 261; see also STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE
POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974).
78. Drucilla Cornell, Post-Structuralism, the Ethical Relation, and the Law, 9 CARDOZO L. REV.
1587, 1628 (1988).
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a record” involves recording the history of the present in which an instance of
injustice to which he can testify is generalized and put into a narrative that ties
his case to a larger picture of “poverty, abuse, and injustice,” and the failure of
law’s promise of equal protection.  The process of generalization involves tell-
ing a story about “other young men and women out there.”  Such a story ad-
dresses the future which may (and should) remember, but whose recollection
can be spoken about only as the possibility of an indeterminate “sometime.”
In spite of such uncertainty, the belief in the importance of making a record
remains pervasive.  As one lawyer said,
I think of what I do as sort of making a narrative.  I’m telling a story with page after
page of facts which are put together to show the richness and complexity of my cli-
ent’s life, of the crime, and of the injustices of his trial.  I am trying to put it together
in a way that people can understand, that pulls heartstrings by getting at what is really
going on.  This is the best way to win in court, and it is the best way to make sure that
the story is not just pushed aside and forgotten.  And if enough of these narratives get
produced, then maybe they won’t be ignored when, say fifty years from now, people
try to figure out why we were executing the people we were executing in the way we
were doing it.
Making such a record, this lawyer explained,
is our way of acting in the world, our way of struggling against the system.  We create
these papers that we write.  They are not going anywhere.  They will be in govern-
ment document warehouses forever.  And I think that someday somebody will look at
this, maybe 100 years from now, but someone will look and say “Oh my God, it was
true that the death penalty was really just an engine of discrimination.”  Even if it
seems fruitless now, it is worth doing because we are making a record of who is get-
ting the death penalty, and it was just the people who were mentally ill and too poor
for treatment who came from unhappy, broken families.  And we did nothing to help
these people, until they did something horrible so we could then get rid of them.
[T]his is not just my perception . . . , I’ve talked with enough other people to describe
this work as a witnessing sort of function.
What seems “fruitless” today takes on meaning when viewed in the long
term.  A society now unwilling to see the linkages between poverty, neglect,
and the death penalty, may “100 years from now” be more receptive.  Lawyer-
ing against the death penalty thus seems like trying to put a crucial piece of
evidence in a time-capsule.  Anti-death penalty lawyers do not just say what
happened, they construct explanations that will focus the future’s attention on
law’s failures as well as mental illness and poverty, on social neglect, and on the
unforgivable desire to “get rid of” people with problems rather than trying to
fix those problems.  The new abolitionism hopes to speak to a broad range of
people of diverse political perspectives as it tries to educate them about what
today’s death penalty is doing to our most enduring legal values.
The new abolitionism is based on what I would call a “democratic opti-
mism,” a belief that present support for the death penalty is rooted in igno-
rance rather than venality, misunderstanding rather than clear-headed com-
mitment.  Here, people in the anti-death penalty movement take instruction
from the late Justice Thurgood Marshall, who, when confronted with evidence
of widespread public endorsement of capital punishment, argued that
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whether a punishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on whether its mere mention
“shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people,” but on whether people
who were fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find
the penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable.79
If they were given such information, Marshall believed, “the great mass of citi-
zens would conclude . . . that the death penalty is immoral and therefore uncon-
stitutional.”80
Some death penalty lawyers argue, following Marshall, that if they hold to
the strategy of the new abolitionism, they indeed will produce such a predict-
able result.  As one woman earnestly explained, “I do not think that the death
penalty will exist X years from now.  While I don’t know what X is, I think at
some point people are going to look back and think ‘Holy, moley, look at what
was going on back then.’”  “Look at Blackmun,” another lawyer said.  “He is
not so very different from the rest of the country.  His evolution is very repre-
sentative of what eventually this country will come to if we continue to do our
work.  We have to look a little longer down the road, beyond the present mo-
ment.”  A third lawyer was even more explicit in his democratic optimism:
I believe that the people of this state, and others, are good people.  Their support for
the death penalty is sustained through a set of interconnected beliefs none of which is
true.  They believe that the legal system is not racist.  And if you could get them to
see that the system picks out black people and sends them to the chair, they would
say, “That’s not fair.”  They believe that in some objective sense the worst offenders
get the death penalty, that death row is full of Charles Mansons who killed more than
one person and who are really super morally culpable.  I think if they were told, like
we are telling everyday, that there are a lot of young kids on the row who were stoned
out of their minds or it isn’t even clear if they pulled the trigger, it would matter.  And
they believe that everybody gets adequate representation.  But if they knew how
abysmally poor a lot of the legal representation is, they would be appalled.  This is
what we see and what we are trying to document.  We are creating a database that is
necessary for any political movement to build on.  We are putting together the rec-
ords through which people will one day learn the truth about capital punishment.
Sentiments like these connect law to the future and establish a different un-
derstanding of the work of anti-death penalty lawyers.  They go back to the fu-
ture by trying to revive the sprit of Furman; they give law a life in and through
time.  Those sentiments help explain the political dimensions of lawyering that
appears legally conservative in its appeal to due process and equal protection
rather than to more transformative visions of society, and seems entirely fo-
cused on the particularities of a single case.
IV
RIDING TO THE RESCUE: THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE
LEGITIMATION OF THE NEW ABOLITIONISM
In spite of its legally conservative character and appeal to mainstream legal
values, those advocating the new abolitionism have been caught in a political
crossfire, accused of frustrating the popular will by being hyper-legalistic, of
                                                          
79. Furman v. Georgia, 408  U.S. 238,  361 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 363 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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using and abusing technicalities to keep their clients alive.  Rather than being
respected as the guardians of important legal values rooted in the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of due process of law or of equal protection,81 anti-
death penalty lawyers are vilified as rogues who violate the canons of their pro-
fession by conducting an ideologically motivated guerilla war against capital
punishment.82  As the Supreme Court put it when it refused to grant a stay of
execution to Robert Alton Harris,83  
Harris seeks an equitable remedy.  Equity must take into consideration the state’s
strong interest in proceeding with its judgment and Harris’s obvious attempt at ma-
nipulation.  This claim could have been brought more than a decade ago.  There is no
good reason for this abusive delay, which has been compounded by last-minute at-
tempts to manipulate the judicial process.84
Such language by now is a regular staple of death penalty cases.85  As Anthony
Amsterdam notes, in a series of cases extending back before the Harris case
and continuing on to today, courts have woven a “conspiracy myth,” a myth of
lawyers pursuing frivolous legal claims in last-minute petitions.86  As Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist put it in Sawyer v. Whitley,
In the every day context of capital penalty proceedings, a federal district judge typi-
cally will be presented with a successive or abusive habeas petition a few days before,
or even on the day of, a scheduled execution. . . .  We of course do not in the least
condone, but instead condemn, any efforts on the part of habeas petitioners to delay
their filings until the last minute with a view to obtaining a stay because the district
court will lack time to give them the necessary consideration before the scheduled
execution.87
The conspiracy myth, Amsterdam contends, gives judges somebody to be angry
at, allows them to deny the legal significance of the issues raised by lawyers
fighting executions, and to explain why so few executions were being carried
out.88  It demonizes anti-death penalty lawyers and discredits the new aboli-
tionism, just as the old abolitionism had been discredited for being sympathetic
to some of society’s most despised persons.
Just at the moment when one might have been prepared to consign the new
abolitionism to the same fate as other forms of abolitionist politics and, in so
                                                          
81. This image is developed by Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney
Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 606 (1988).  As Mello argues,
The post-conviction process has become an integral part of the system of capital punishment.
The post-conviction component of the system is necessary because it exposes injustices. . . .  It
is necessary to the integrity of a legal system that strives to tame the death penalty within the
rule of law.  In turn, lawyers are essential to the integrity of the post-conviction process.
Id.
82. See Note, The Legal Defense Fund’s Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of
Death, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 158 (1985).
83. Harris was the first person executed in California in the post-Furman era.
84. Gomez v. United States, 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) (citations omitted).  For an important re-
sponse, see Charles M. Sevilla & Michael Laurence, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents:
The Death Penalty Case of Robert Alton Harris, 40 UCLA L. REV. 345 (1992).
85. See Amsterdam, supra note 11.
86. Id.
87. 505 U.S. 333, 341 & n.7 (1992).
88. See Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 36-37.
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doing, to accept that the demand for death now knows no constitutional scru-
pulousness, an important new voice has entered the fray.89  Three years to the
month after Blackmun’s 1994 dissent in Callins v. Collins, the American Bar
Association90 called for a complete moratorium on executions in the United
States.91  Taking us back to Furman’s condemnation of the death penalty as
“then administered,” the ABA proclaims that the death penalty as “currently
administered” is not compatible with the central values of our Constitution.
Since Furman, the effort to produce a constitutionally acceptable death penalty
has, in the view of the ABA, been to no avail.  Thus, the ABA “calls upon each
jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment not to carry out the death penalty
until the jurisdiction implements policies and procedures . . . intended to (1) en-
sure that death penalty cases are administered fairly and impartially, in accor-
dance with due process, and (2) minimize the risk that innocent people may be
executed.”92
However, the language of the ABA resolution, unlike Blackmun in Callins,
seems conditional and contingent in its condemnation of death as a punish-
ment.  Even as it calls for a cessation of executions, it appears to hold out hope
for a process of reform in which the death penalty can be brought within consti-
tutionally acceptable norms.  As if to leave little doubt of its intention, the
ABA resolution concludes by stating that the Association “takes no position on
the death penalty.”93
The ABA recommendation, whatever its explicit refusal to take a position
on the ultimate question of the constitutionality of capital punishment,
amounts to a call for the abolition, not merely the cessation, of capital punish-
ment.  It does the work of Blackmun’s new abolition without his overt and
categorical renunciation.  If one takes seriously the conclusions of the report
accompanying the ABA’s recommendation, then the largest, most conservative
association of lawyers in the country is asking Americans to save further dam-
age to the law by ending the death penalty.  In so doing, the ABA provides a
striking response to the continuing anxiety that attends law’s embrace of the
state’s ultimate violence.94  Just as rushing a fresh contingent of troops into a
                                                          
89. The next several pages draw heavily on my article Abolitionism as Legal Conservatism, supra
note 34 ( 1997 The Johns Hopkins University Press; used with permission).
90. On the politics of the ABA, see JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE (1976); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 639 (1981).
91. ABA Resolution, supra note 35, at 1, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 35, at 219.
92. Id.
93. Id., reprinted in Appendix, supra note 35, at 220.
94. This anxiety arises because that violence, as both a linguistic and physical phenomenon, as fact
and metaphor, is integral to the constitution of the modern state.  See Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns, A Journey Through Forgetting: Toward a Jurisprudence of Violence, in THE FATE OF LAW 209
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991).  That state is built on representations of aggression,
force, and disruption lurking just beyond its boundaries.  In large measure, the state seeks to authorize
and legitimate its bloodletting as a lesser or necessary evil and as a response to our inability to live a
truly free life without external discipline and restraint.  Yet the proximity of the state to, and its de-
pendence on, violence raises a nagging question and a persistent doubt about whether it can ever be
more than violence or whether the violence law condones is truly different from, and superior to, what
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battle going badly may reinvigorate those grown weary, even if ultimately it
does not stem the tide, so too the ABA’s action provides an important response
to the courts’ conspiracy myths; it provides crucial symbolic capital for the anti-
death penalty community and legitimation to the new abolitionism.
The ABA report provides three reasons for its call for a moratorium on
executions, each a crucial component of the new abolitionism.95  The first is the
failure of most states to guarantee competent counsel in capital cases.  Because
most states have no regular public defender systems, indigent capital defen-
dants frequently are assigned a lawyer with no interest, or experience, in capital
litigation.96  The result is often incompetent defense lawyering, lawyering that
has become all the more damaging in light of new rules requiring that defenses
cannot be raised on appeal or in habeas proceedings if they are not raised, or if
they are waived, at trial.97  The ABA itself calls for the appointment of “two
experienced attorneys at each stage of a capital case.”98  While, in theory, indi-
vidual states could provide competent counsel in death cases, and while there is
ample evidence to suggest the value of skilled lawyers in preventing the imposi-
tion of death sentences,99 the political climate in the United States as it touches
on the crime problem suggests that there is, in fact, little prospect for a wide-
spread embrace of the ABA’s call for competent counsel.
The second basis for the ABA’s recommended moratorium is the recent
erosion in post-conviction protections for capital defendants.  While the ABA
notes that “the federal courts should consider claims that were not properly
raised in state court if the reason for the default was counsel’s ignorance or ne-
glect and that a prisoner should be permitted to file a second or successive fed-
eral petitions if it raises a new claim that undermines confidence in his or her
guilt or the appropriateness of the death sentence,”100 the direction of legal
change is, as I already have noted, in the opposite direction.  Today courts in
the United States are prepared to accept that some innocent people, or some
defendants who do not deserve death, will be executed.101  As Justice Rehnquist
observed in Herrera v. Collins, “due process does not require that every con-
                                                          
lurks beyond its boundaries.  See Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Author-
ity”, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 921 (1990).
95. The report and recommendation both call for a permanent halt to the execution of juveniles
and the mentally retarded.
96. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime, but
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
97. See Ronald Tabak, Pannel Discussion: Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in This
Corpus? Commentary, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 523, 581 (1996) (comments of Scharlette Holdman).
98. American Bar Ass’n, Report No. 107, at 5 (1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 35, at 223
[hereinafter ABA Report].
99. See Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 19 (1993).
100. ABA Report, supra note 98, at 10, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 35, at 227.
101. See MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN
CAPITAL CASES 271 (1992); see also Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital
Cases, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (Autumn 1998); Michael L. Radelet & Hugo Adam Bedau,
The Execution of the Innocent, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (Autumn 1998).
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ceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convict-
ing an innocent person.”102  And for Rehnquist, what is true in the general run
of criminal cases is also true in death cases.  If a few errors are made, a few in-
nocent lives taken, that is simply the price of a system able to execute anyone at
all.  In Rehnquist’s view, finality in capital cases is more important than an ex-
tended, and extremely frustrating, quest for justice.103  For him, and others like
him, the apparent impotence of law, its inability to turn death sentences into
executions, is more threatening to its legitimacy than a few erroneous, unde-
served deaths at the hands of the state.
Here again, what the ABA asks for, namely a restoration of some of the
previously available habeas remedies, is theoretically conceivable.  Yet, like ef-
forts to improve the quality of defense counsel in capital cases, it is hardly a
likely or near-term possibility.
The third reason for the ABA’s call for a moratorium is found in the
“longstanding patterns of racial discrimination . . . in courts around the coun-
try,”104 patterns of discrimination that have repeatedly been called to the atten-
tion of the judiciary and cited by anti-death penalty lawyers as reasons why the
death penalty violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protec-
tion.  The ABA report cites research showing that defendants are more likely
to receive a death sentence if their victim is white rather than black,105 and that
in some jurisdictions, African-Americans tend to receive the death penalty
more often than do white defendants.106  The report calls for the development
of “effective mechanisms” to eliminate racial prejudice in capital cases, yet
does not identify what such mechanisms would be.107  Indeed, it is not clear that
any such mechanisms exist.
The pernicious effects of race in capital sentencing are a function of the
pervasiveness of racial prejudice throughout the society combined with the
wide degree of discretion necessary to afford individualized justice in capital
prosecutions and capital trials.  Prosecutors with limited resources may be in-
clined to allocate resources to cases that attract the greatest public attention,
which often will mean cases where the victim was white and his or her assailant
black.  Participants in the legal system—whether white or black—demonize
young black males, seeing them as more deserving of death as a punishment
because of their perceived dangerousness.108  These cultural effects clearly are
not remediable.  As Blackmun noted in Callins,
                                                          
102. 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977)).
103. See id. at 417.
104. ABA Report, supra note 98, at 11, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 35, at 228.
105. See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 399-400 (1990).
106. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCES 45 (1989).
107. ABA Report, supra note 98, at 14, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 35, at 230.
108. See Judith Butler, Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia, in
READING RODNEY KING/READING URBAN UPRISING 15 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993).
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[W]e may not be capable of devising procedural or substantive rules to prevent the
more subtle and often unconscious forms of racism from creeping into the system. . . .
[D]iscrimination and arbitrariness could not be purged from the administration of
capital punishment without sacrificing the equally essential component of fairness-
individualized sentencing.109
V
CONCLUSION
What does all of this say about the meaning and significance of the ABA’s
recommendation?  In my view, while it appears that the ABA is still willing to
tinker with the machinery of death, in fact, the ABA’s indictment of the system
of capital sentencing is pervasive and damning.  No well-intentioned reformism
can save that system.  Taking its recommendation and report seriously reminds
us that the post-Furman effort to rationalize death sentences has utterly failed;
it has been replaced by a policy that favors execution while trimming away pro-
cedural protection for capital defendants.  This situation only exacerbates the
incompatibility of capital punishment and legality.  Like Justice Blackmun and
the community of lawyers fighting to stop executions, the ABA has embraced
the new abolitionism, eschewing a direct address to state violence and relying
instead on an indirect, though nonetheless devastating, critique.  The ABA
provides legitimacy to those lawyers in the face of direct and persistent attacks.
Its endorsement of the new abolitionism may help sustain their efforts to speak
to the future and call it to protect law by ending state killing.
In the end, the ABA’s embrace of the new abolitionism reveals a persistent,
unalleviated anxiety about the state’s ultimate form of violence, an anxious in-
sistence that the state, though it comes into the world born of physical violence,
or the violent disruptions of the existing order of things,110 transcend the vio-
lence of its origins.  For the ABA, as well as for Justice Blackmun, the rejection
of the death penalty takes the form of an effort to prevent the erosion of the
boundaries between state violence and its extra-legal counterpart.  This effort,
while speaking to some of the most pressing issues facing today’s capital pun-
ishment system, recaptures the spirit of Furman.  Yet while it calls us back to
Furman’s critique of the practices of capital punishment, and to its doubts
about whether those practices could be squared with the law’s requirements, it
radicalizes Furman by reminding all Americans of this country’s continuing in-
ability, more than twenty-five years later, to get state killing right.
The ABA, in effect, has legitimated the crucial complaints voiced in today’s
abolitionist movement without itself reaching an overtly abolitionist conclu-
sion.  By speaking in the name of civic idealism rather than partisan engage-
ment, it provides symbolic capital to those on the front lines in the battle
against state killing.  While there is little immediate prospect that its recom-
                                                          
109. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1154-55 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of cer-
tiorari to Callins v. Collins, 998 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1993)).
110. See Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS, APHORISMS, AND
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITING 300 (Edmund Jephcott trans., 1978).
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mended moratorium will come to pass, the ABA’s action, at least for a time,
helps secure the political space from which anti-death penalty lawyers can con-
tinue to call future generations some day to recapture and vindicate the spirit
of Furman.
